Philosophy of Logical Analysis Modern physics and physiology throw a new light upon the ancient problem of perception. If there is to be anything that can be called 'perception', it must be in some degree an effect of the object perceived, and it must more or less resemble the object if it is to be a source of knowledge of the object. The first requisite can only be fulfilled if there are causal chains which are, to a greater or lesser extent, independent of the rest of the world. According to physics, this is the case. Modern analytical empiricism differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than philosophy. It has the advantage; as compared with philosophies of system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. There remains, however, a vast field, traditionally included in philosophy, where scientific methods are inadequate. This field includes ultimate questions of value; science alone, for example, cannot prove that it is bad to enjoy the infliction cruelty. Whatever can be known, can be known by means of science; but things which are legitimately matters of feeling lie outside its province. Philosophy, throughout its history, has consisted of two parts inharmoniously blended: on the one hand, a theory as to the nature of the world, on the other hand, an ethical or political doctrine as to the best way of living. (A)The failure to separate these two with sufficient clarity has been a source of much confused thinking. (B)Philosophers, from Plato to William James, have allowed their opinions as to the constitution of the universe to be influenced by the desire for edification: knowing, as they supposed, what beliefs would make men virtuous, they have invented arguments, often very sophisticated, to prove that these beliefs are true. (C)Morally, a philosopher who uses his professional competence for anything except a disinterested search for truth is guilty of a kind of treachery. And when he assumes, in advance of inquiry, that certain beliefs, whether true or false, are such as to promote good behavior, he is so limiting the scope of philosophical speculation as to make philosophy trivial; the true philosopher is prepared to examine all preconceptions. (D)When any limits are placed, consciously or unconsciously, upon the pursuit of truth, philosophy becomes paralyzed by fear, and the ground is prepared for a government censorship punishing those who utter 'dangerous thoughts' -in fact, the philosopher has already placed such a censorship over his own investigations. Intellectually, the effect of mistaken moral considerations upon philosophy has been to impede progress to an extraordinary extent. I do not myself believe that philosophy can either prove or disapprove the truth of religious dogmas, but ever since Plato most philosophers have considered it part of their business to produce 'proofs' of immortality and the existence of God. They have found fault with the proofs of their predecessors—Saint Thomas rejected Saint Anselms proofs, and Kant rejected Descartes—but they have supplied new ones of their own. In order to make their proofs seem valid, they have had to falsify logic, to make mathematics mystical, and to pretend that deep-seated prejudices were heaven-sent intuitions. All this is rejected by the philosophers who make logical analysis the main business of philosophy. They confess frankly that the human intellect is of profound importance to mankind, but they refuse to believe that there is some 'higher' way of knowing, by which we can discover truths hidden from science and the intellect. For this renunciation, they have been rewarded by the discovery that many questions, formerly obscured by the fog of metaphysics, can be answered with precision, and by objective methods which .introduce nothing of the philosophers temperament except the desire to understand. Take such questions as. What is a number? What are space and time? What is mind, and what is matter? I do not say that we can here and now give definite answers to all these ancient questions, but I do say that a method has been discovered by which, as in science, we can make successive approximations to the truth. According to the passage, Amess appearance at last years meeting showed that ______.